Dr. Clayton’s thesis
Posted in Anonymity, Security, phd on November 23rd, 2006 by gavin – 2 CommentsAs I mentioned in the last post, I’m working on a Tor simulation. I spend most of my time doing that and haven’t had much of a chance to do as much reading on current research as I should. One particular document I was quite interested in was Richard Clayton’s Ph.D. thesis. Dr. Clayton does a lot of very practical security research, which can be a breath of fresh air compared to the standard academic papers on security. By that I mean his papers are extremely readable, practical and not overflowing with maths. (Along with mornings, me and maths don’t get on too well)
I finished re-reading the Aubrey-Maturin series again the other day on my 770, so downloaded a copy of Clayton’s thesis as my bedtime reading! There are a number of very interesting tricks and techniques raised in the thesis, quite a lot of which I hadn’t encountered before. I thought that I would post up some of the more interesting ones. I’m sure a lot of these are common knowledge, but I was surprised by some.
The title of the thesis is “Anonymity and traceability in cyberspace” and mostly deals with the issue of traceability.
IP TCP Stream Spoofing
Ip TCP spoofing isn’t as impossible as it should be. The problem with spoofing a complete conversation is that the ACK numbers on each packet being sent out need to be correct. They need to be the same as the sequence numbers recieved. To prevent easy guessing of the sequence numbers, the initial sequence number is randomised. So the attacker must guess a 2^32 value correctly in order to spoof a conversation. This sounds great, the problem is that equipment vendors don’t follow this rule all the time. Alcatel equipment for example does not use a random value, instead a chosen value is incremented by 64,000 every millisecond. This is all detailed on pg27, and a CERT Advisory
ADSL Authentication
When authenticating a DSL connection, the users DSL modem connects to a DSLAM in the telephone exchange. The DSLAM creates a Permanent Virtual Circuit (PVC) to a “Home Gateway”. The authentication details are then offered to the Home Gateway by the DSL Modem which in turn will hand them onto the correct ISP RADIUS server. The ISP RADIUS server is chosen based on the username of the authentication details. e.g gavin@eircom.net will go to Eircoms ISP, gavin@esatbt.ie will go to ESAT BTs RADIUS server etc. The RADIUS server will authenticate the user and then allocate them an IP using DHCP.
The issue with this is that I can borrow another persons authentication details and commit some nefarious act on the Internet. When the IP used in the nefarious act is traced back, it will lead to the owner, and not me. The only way to verify in fact I was the one using that IP is to check the logs of the Home Gateway. This will show what PVC was used to pass on the authentication details, back to the DSLAM and back to the physical socket connecting my telephone to the DSLAM.
The only problem is that apparently the Home Gateway may not actually log this information. Pg43.
Playing with reverse DNS
Plenty of interesting things one can do with reverse DNS it seems. For example Apache logs use an IP address at the start, or can reverse resolve this IP and use the DNS instead. If the reverse DNS address looks like an IP, then effectively a fake IP can be substituted in the logs. There are options to disable this, or do full IP checking in Apache. Reverse DNS is disabled by default, and if enabled double DNS lookups can be performed. Indeed any sort of string could be inserted into the logs with this trick. Pg50 and this article
The same sort of trick can be performed on an IRC server. The server should log just the IP, but this isn’t always the case. Pg55.
And again, in e-mails, to fool someone that doesn’t thoroughly investigate the headers. In this case an ip was configured to resolve to bay15-f8.bay15.hotmail.com and extra hotmail specific information such as X-Originating-IP: added. The IP for x-originating of course was a false one. Pg59
HopFake
A simple trick for creating false traceroutes. When an ICMP echo packet arrives at the local machine and the TTL value is zero, don’t respond with an echo, respond with a TTL exceeded and a different IP address. The machine sending the traceroute packet assumes that your machine is a router and will send another ICMP echo packet with TTL+1. You can then respond to this new ICMP echo with either an echo and a different IP address, or send back another TTL and continue on the traceroute. Nice little trick. Pg54 and a copy of hopfake
That’s just small small knick knacky things from the thesis, I have yet to read the remaining two thirds.

